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This paper examines the impact of crime on foreign direct investment (FDI) inﬂows in the
Italian provinces. The incidence of organized crime is measured by the number of complaints
regarding criminal offences of different kinds traditionally related to the maﬁa organizations.
The results show how the correlation between organized crime and FDI is both negative and
signiﬁcant, even when an indicator of ﬁnancial incentives for investment is included in the
regressions. Our analysis shows that crime represents a deterrent for foreign investors,
suggesting that high levels of (certain) crimes may be perceived as a signal of a local socio-
institutional environment unfavourable for FDI.
© 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
Numerous studies show that the “quality” of the legal, political and institutional environment (“institutions” in a broad sense)
tends to inﬂuence the amount of FDI received by a country. For instance, an institutional environment favourable for FDI includes:
the ease with which a company can be set up, government effectiveness, security of property rights, the efﬁciency of judicial
systems (Globerman and Shapiro, 2002; Altomonte, 2000; Bénassy-Quéré et al., 2007; Daude and Stein, 2007) and the lack of
violence and corruption (Wei, 2000; Habib and Zurawicki, 2001; Broadman and Recanatini, 2000).
This paper aims to verify whether the quality of a socio-institutional environment also inﬂuences FDI at the regional level. The
case considered is that of Italy, a country that is interesting for various reasons. In Italy there are major differences in the FDI
amounts received by different regions: in the period 2005–2006, the eight Southern regions (theMezzogiorno area), where 35% of
the Italian population lives, received about 1% of total FDI inﬂow. Different socioeconomic conditions exist in the North and South
of Italy. One major concern is the incidence of crime. It is well known that in the South there is a historically rooted presence of
organized crime of the maﬁa type. This presence can be considered an additional risk (or an additional cost) for business. Crime,
especially themaﬁa, may condition business activities in various ways: racketeering; retail market limitations; market distortions
(Centorrino et al., 1999; Dawid et al., 2002). A high presence of organized crime should therefore be considered an aspect of an
unfavourable business climate and, consequently, a disincentive for foreign and national investments.
Using data for different kinds of crime and a panel data analysis, this study examines the impact of crime on FDI inﬂow in 103
Italian provinces during the period 2002–2006. The results show that organized crime is negatively and strongly correlated with
FDI inﬂow. This correlation is robust even when an indicator for ﬁnancial incentives to investments is included in the regressions.
Our analysis suggests that organized crime is a disincentive to investment and the possibility is not excluded that crime may be
perceived by foreign investors as a signal of a socio-institutional system unfavourable for FDI.
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The remainder of the paper is as follows: Section 2 illustrates the regional distributions of FDI inﬂows in Italy and its
determinants; Section 3 offers a brief review of the economic effects of crime; Section 4 describes the data and the results of the
empirical analysis. Finally, Section 5 contains some conclusive remarks.
2. FDI in Italy
2.1. Regional distribution
FDI tends to be concentrated in certain areas in all countries. In Spain, Madrid and Cataluña are the main destinations of FDI;
also in France, Greece and the UK there are clear differences between the regions.1 In Italy, FDI is highly concentrated. As shown in
Table 1, Lombardy received 69% of the FDI inﬂows in the two-year period 2005–2006, followed by Piedmont (13%), and Lazio (7%).
Other regional shares are far lower. Overall, the Centre-North of Italy received almost all the FDI inﬂows. The share of the
Mezzogiorno area is residual, amounting to less than 1% of the national total. Equally high regional differences exist considering
the FDI ratio of GDP. In the period 2000–2005, net FDI inﬂows represented 1.6% of GDP in the Northwest, 0.6% in the Central
regions and just 0.1% in the South.
At provincial level, FDI concentration is even greater. Table 2 shows the ﬁrst and last ten provinces, ranked on the basis of FDI
inﬂows in the period 2004–2006. Notably, the province ofMilan alone absorbs over 66% of total FDI and the top three provinces are
large urban areas. Moreover, the data show that nine of the last ten provinces are in the Mezzogiorno area.
The presence of FDI in Italian regions may be examined more in depth using data on the number of ﬁrms with foreign
participation located in Italy. Of over 7100 ﬁrms with foreign participation operating in Italy in 2006, only 318 (4.5% of the total)
had headquarters in Southern Italy (Table 3). By comparison, in Lombardy the number of ﬁrms with foreign participation was ten
times higher than in the entire Mezzogiorno. As observed for FDI ﬂows, the case of Lombardy is striking: half of all the Italian ﬁrms
with foreign capital, generating over 45% of employment and sales of all such ﬁrms, are based there. Piedmont, Lazio and Emilia
follow. Over 95% of sales and employment generated by multinationals headquartered in Italy in 2006 were in the Centre-North.
Consequently, the Southern regions, with less than 5% of sales and employment generated by multinational enterprises, play a
marginal role in the passive internationalisation of Italy.
2.2. Determinants of FDI inﬂows
The empirical literature on FDI determinants is extensive (Barba Navaretti and Venables, 2004). With particular reference to
the European Union, some of the principle studies show how the location of foreign ﬁrms is guided mainly by the ﬁrms' speciﬁc
1 For France, cfr. Mayer (2004); for Spain, Hermosilla and Ortega (2001) and Pelegrín and Bolancé (2008); for Britain, Devereux et al. (2007); for Greece,
Kokkinou and Psycharis (2004). The regional distribution of FDI in Italy is examined, among others, by Basile (2001, 2004), Basile et al. (2004), Daniele (2005)
and Basile and Giunta (2005).
Table 1
FDI inﬂows in the Italian regions in percentage of Italy, 2005 and 2006.
Source: Italian Exchange Ofﬁce (UIC).
Regions 2005 2006
Abruzzo 0.1 0.1
Basilicata 0.2 0.2
Calabria 0.0 0.0
Campania 0.3 0.2
Emilia Romagna 2.5 3.7
Friuli 0.1 0.1
Lazio 6.2 7.8
Liguria 0.5 0.7
Lombardy 69.7 68.2
Marche 0.1 0.0
Molise 0.1 0.0
Piedmont 15.5 11.4
Puglia 0.1 0.2
Sardinia 0.0 0.1
Sicily 0.0 0.0
Tuscany 3.6 1.9
Trentino A. A. 0.2 0.5
Umbria 1.0 0.8
Valle d'Aosta 0.0 0.0
Veneto 4.3 4.2
Centre-North 99.2 99.3
Mezzogiorno 0.8 0.7
Data refer to FDI gross ﬂows IDE and do not include trade credits and transactions in the banking sector.
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characteristics and, to a lesser extent, by observable national or regional factors. Although these factors are diverse depending on
the Countries considered, the empirical literature on FDI determinants indicates some fundamental characteristics common to the
Countries or regions in which foreign investors tend to invest (Crozet et al., 2004; Artige and Nicolini, 2005; Barrios et al., 2006;
Devereux et al., 2007; Barry et al., 2007). In the European Union, FDI tends to locate in regions with: 1) a large potential internal
and external market; 2) high population density; 3) the presence of other foreign investors (signal effect); 4) good infrastructure
and accessibility; 4) a highly educated workforce and a high level of R&D expenditure; and 5) the presence of agglomeration
economies, determined by numerous competitors, clients and suppliers within the ﬁrm's industry (Alegría, 2006; European
Commission, 2006).
Some recent literature has been devoted to investigating how FDI is inﬂuenced by diverse national political, institutional and
legal systems (Globerman and Shapiro, 2002; Bénassy-Quéré et al., 2007). The quality of institutions may be important for FDI for
several reasons. Firstly—according to studies on long-term growth determinants—efﬁcient institutions improve productivity
prospects and this attracts investors. Secondly, a poor institutional environment means additional costs for ﬁrms: often the case
with crime and corruption (Broadman and Recanatini, 2000; Wei, 2000; United Nations, 2007). Furthermore, due to high sunk
costs—FDI is highly exposed to uncertainty, including that stemming from poor government efﬁciency, graft or the weak
enforcement of property rights and of the legal system. Studies generally conﬁrm that a “good” institutional environment is an
important determinant for FDI inﬂows. This institutional environment—or “governing infrastructures”—includes, for instance, the
ease with which a company can be set up, government effectiveness, security of property rights, the efﬁciency of the judicial
systems and the lack of corruption (Habib and Zurawicki, 2001; Bénassy-Quéré et al., 2007; Daude and Stein, 2007). The World
Bank (2001) and some case-studies (United Nations, 2007; Broadman and Recanatini, 2001) suggest that the attraction of
investments is greater in areas with low levels of crime and corruption. From the international literature it emerges clearly,
therefore, how the quality of the institutional system and the business climate inﬂuence decisions regarding foreign companies'
choice of location. Such an effect could also be relevant at regional level when, as in Italy, notable differences exist in the quality of
the local socio-institutional environments.
3. Crime as an economic disincentive
The effects of organized crime on economic development in Italy have been widely examined from the sociological and
historical points of view, but far less so from the economic viewpoint. Economists, in fact, have often concentrated more on the
Table 2
Top and bottom provinces ranked for FDI inﬂows in Italy in the years 2004–2006, in %.
Source: Calculations on Italian Exchange Ofﬁce data.
Rank Provinces FDI
1 Milan 66.46
2 Turin 9.25
3 Rome 6.33
4 Florence 3.06
5 Verona 2.86
6 Bologna 2.63
7 Cuneo 2.03
8 Terni 0.99
9 Alessandria 0.75
10 Vicenza 0.56
94 Foggia 0.001
95 Ragusa 0.001
96 Reggio Cal. 0.001
97 Gorizia 0.001
98 Agrigento 0.001
99 Catanzaro 0.001
100 Caltanissetta 0.001
101 Enna 0.000
102 Vibo Valentia 0.000
103 Oristano 0.000
Table 3
Number, employees and sales of Italian ﬁrms with foreign participation.
Source: Elaborations of the Reprint data base, ICE-Milan Polytechnic.
Years Firms Employees Sales
Centre-North South Centre-North South Centre-North South
2001 6359 329 850,698 62,136 315,290 18,611
2004 6739 347 867,294 60,071 346,353 18,031
2006 6776 318 811,144 46,895 378,597 15,481
For the region where the ﬁrm is headquartered; data refer to total participation and to January 1st in each of the years considered.
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determinants of criminality than on the effects that it produces on the economy (Marselli and Vannini, 1997; Buonanno, 2006).
Some recent studies show, however, how organized crime can inﬂuence both economic growth and the quality of local
institutional systems (Centorrino and Ofria, 2008; Peri, 2004). Crime conditions business activities in many ways. Generally, it
increases the risks for (and the costs of) investment because of possible attacks, intimidation and the destruction of property. One
typical criminal activity—particular of themaﬁa—is the extortion racket. It ensures a ﬁxed income, generally directed to ﬁnancing
other illegal activities, and allows criminal organizations to exercise widespread territorial control where a clan exercises its
power. Maﬁa organizations also control the local economy in other ways. Clans often force legal companies to purchase raw
materials from speciﬁc suppliers, hire personnel that are linked to the organizations and respect obligations or limits to sales
markets. Extortion and the control of a part of the legal economy have been well documented in judiciary inquests and are the
subjects of much research (La Spina and Lo Forte, 2006; CPI, 2008).2 Numerous inquests testify how organized crime even
manages to condition the activities of large companies involved in public works in Southern regions (Confesercenti, 2007).
Furthermore, through violence or corruption, it imposes monopolies, conditioning the functioning of the markets and local
institutions, distorting the allocation of resources and pocketing a part of public expenditure, including European funds for
regional development (CPI, 2008). The functional capabilities of themarket and the institutions are therefore compromised and, as
a result, the development of the same local economies is negatively affected (Centorrino and Signorino, 1993).
The presence of organized crime imposes notable economic (and social) costs in many areas of Southern Italy. One such cost,
which is rarely considered, derives from the fact that the criminal presence tends to discourage both domestic and foreign
investment. Conﬁrmation of this comes from some surveys directed at potential investors, both Italian and foreign. One survey
conducted of a panel of businessmen from North-Eastern Italy, shows how almost all those interviewed (92.6%) believed the
presence of criminality to be the principal block to investment in the Mezzogiorno area (Marini and Turato, 2002). An enquiry
conducted on behalf of the Ministry of the Economy in 11 Countries conﬁrmed that, in businessmen's perception, Mezzogiorno
appears to be an area lacking conditions of security (Gpf-Ispo, 2005).3 The deterrent effect of crime on foreign investors has been
highlighted for years by economists. Over twenty years ago, Sylos Labini (1985) and Olson (1984) observed how the presence of
organized crime in the South forces companies to transfer elsewhere, discouraging those who intend to invest. Although rich with
implications, the observations of Paolo Sylos Labini and Mancur Olson have received little attention. Only recently have some
studies on FDI determinants considered the crime rate among the explicative variables used in the analysis, showing how, in Italy,
high crime rates tend to be negatively correlated with the regional capacity to attract foreign investors (Basile, 2001; Pazienza
et al., 2005; Daniele, 2005, 2007; Daniele and Marani, 2008).
With respect to these studies our analysis differs in method and content. We used panel data for a disaggregated level of
territory (103 provinces) and different estimation procedures; furthermore, we considered different crimes, focussing in
particular on those of the maﬁa type. As far as we are aware, our research constitutes the ﬁrst attempt aimed explicitly at
estimating the impact of crime on FDI in Italy.
3.1. Measuring organized crime
It is not easy to quantify the territorial spread of organized crime (in particular themaﬁa). Data are often lacking and, for certain
crimes, the number of complaints tends to under-report the effective dimension of the phenomenon. Notwithstanding these
limitations, we based our calculations on ofﬁcial data in order to estimate the incidence of different crimes. It should bemade clear
that not all offences are typical of organized crime: some, such as theft, corruption or sexual violence are not, generally, typical of
criminal organizations, above all themaﬁa. For these reasons, and on the basis of studies on the subject, we constructed an index of
organized crime based only on certain crimes: extortion, bomb attacks, arson and criminal associations.
As already mentioned, extortion represents a crime typical of the maﬁa. As judiciary inquests testify, all clans exercise their
power in a territory through extortion, however ofﬁcial data notably under-report the numbers of crimes committed, particularly
in Southern regions. Whenever extortion is imposed by maﬁosi, only a small number of victims actually denounce the crime.
Estimates and inquiries into victimisation show how, in many Southern provinces, the phenomenon is much greater than in fact
indicated by the data based only on complaints. According to some estimates provided by the Confederation of commercial
activities, in 2007, the ‘racket of kick-backs' touched 70% of Sicilian entrepreneurs, 50% of those in Calabria, 40% of those in
Campania, and 30% of those in Apulia, for a total of over 120,000 in all (Confesercenti, 2007).4 In Sicily, the estimated costs of
extortion represent 1.3% of the overall regional GDP (Asmundo, and Lisciandra, 2008).
2 According to the data contained within the Annual Report of the Parliamentary Commission of Inquest on criminal organisations (Commissione
parlamentare, 2008), in the area of the judicial district of Catanzaro, in Calabria, companies which resist the pressures from organized crime are practically non-
existent; furthermore, the report carries the denouncements made by the representative of a large Tour Operator, Parmatour, who declared that tourist resort
villages in Calabria were systematically subject to extortion.
3 The issue of security and its importance for internal and external investments in the Mezzogiorno has long been part of the political and economic debate in
Italy. Recently, a series of events has made this issue one of the most urgent for development in Southern Italy. The Federation of Antiracket and Anti-usury
Associations (FAI) has proposed the establishment of a “security tutor” for foreign ﬁrms interested in investing in the Mezzogiorno (FAI, Antiracket tutoring,
Experimental three-year project, Naples, 12 December 2007). One of the reasons behind the above project was the declaration made by the President of the Italian
Council of Ministers at the Anti-maﬁa summit, on November 17th 2006, according to which organized crime represents a signiﬁcant deterrent for foreign ﬁrms
interested in investing in Southern Italian regions.
4 Such estimates must be considered very prudently because of the lack of a controllable methodology in collecting and processing the data.
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Since the number of complaints only partially represents the effective extent of the racket, it is necessary to consider other
crimeswhich are symptomatic indicators of the activities of organized crime such as bomb attacks and arson. These crimes, used to
threaten and intimidate the economic operators or politicians, obviously cannot be concealed by the victims, as often happens in
the case of extortion (La Spina and Lo Forte, 2006). Finally, we considered the number of people denounced for criminal
association, includingmaﬁa-type association; crimes which are foreseen by Italian Penal Code. To summarize, with the calculation
of the incidence of organized crime being given by the sum of the four crimes (extortion, bomb attacks, arson, and criminal
association) per 10,000 inhabitants, in the period 2001–2005 these crimes represented approximately 1% of the cumulative total
of all crimes denounced in Italy.
Fig. 1 shows the incidence of the four considered crimes. On average, the incidence of these crimes is far higher in the
Mezzogiorno with respect to the rest of Italy. Signiﬁcant differences exist between Southern regions: crime is, in fact, extremely
high in Calabria, Campania, Sicily and Apulia, regions where the maﬁa organizations, Cosa nostra, ‘Ndrangheta, Camorra and the
Sacra corona unita, are historically based. Fig. 2 illustrates the “geography of crime” through our index of organized crime. Not only
does Fig. 2 indicate the clear existence of signiﬁcant differences between the North and South, but it also seems to faithfully
reproduce the “map” of themaﬁa families that emerges from judicial enquiries and reports compiled by those Institutions that deal
with criminal phenomena (CPI, 2008). On the basis of these indices we shall examine the impact of crime on FDI in the following
paragraph, seeking to verify through the data whether, as the entrepreneurs interviewed in the surveys and numerous economic
analysts and politicians maintain, crime is an effective block for potential foreign investors.
4. The empirical analysis
4.1. Data description
To estimate the impact of crime on FDI we constructed a dataset comprising observations for 103 Italian provinces for the
period 2002–2006. Our empirical exercise uses a log-linear equation that is consistent with the theoretical background on the
determinants of FDI inﬂows. The basic equation takes the following form:
FDIi;t = α + β1Xi;t1 + β2Crimei;t1 + wit ð1Þ
where i represents province, t time and wi,t=ei+ui,t is the error term. The dependent variable is the log of FDI inﬂow in the
provinces, Xi,t−1 is a set of lagged control variables, while Crime is a measure of the incidence of crime.
Dependent variable. The data on FDI inﬂow in the Italian provinces is gathered by UIC (the Italian Ofﬁce of Exchange) in order to
compile the balance of payments. In conformity with international deﬁnitions, the FDI establish a long-term interest between a
company headquartered abroad and one headquartered in Italy. Hence the deﬁnition comprises fusions with Italian companies
and acquisitions, even partial, by foreign ﬁrms and the greenﬁeld investments, although UIC data do not allow us to distinguish
between the two types of direct investment.5 Because of the way in which they are collected, the data on FDI present some
Fig. 1. Crime incidence per 10,000 inhabitants, 2000–2005. Cumulated values.
Source: Calculations on Istat data “Territorial information system on justice”.
5 According to the ofﬁcial deﬁnitions, a direct investment enterprise is an incorporated enterprise in which a foreign investor owns 10% or more of the ordinary
shares or voting power for an incorporated enterprise, or an unincorporated enterprise in which a foreign investor has equivalent ownership (IMF-OECD, 2000).
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limitations, the most important of which is the fact that when investment ﬂows transit via one or more intermediaries, the
methods of reception (immediate beneﬁciary) do not permit control over the ﬁnal geographical destination (Mariotti and
Mutinelli, 2009). For this reason, the comparison between data on ﬂows and those relative to the number of multinational
companies should be made with great care. Notwithstanding limitations, the regional distribution of foreign ﬁrms that results
from data on FDI and data based on the number of plants, presents many similarities; furthermore, empirical research on FDI
determinants, conducted using the two data-sources, generally leads to similar conclusions. The FDI data have the advantage of
provincial (and sectoral) disaggregation and of a wide temporal coverage, permitting comparison to analogous data furnished by
international institutions. Furthermore, these data are used both in empirical analyses on the determinants of FDI (Bronzini, 2004)
and in descriptive research to quantify Italy's attractiveness to investors.
Crime measures. The incidence of organized crime is measured by the index described in Section 3.1, constructed as the sum of
extortion, bomb attacks, arson and crimes of criminal association per 10,000 inhabitants. Other kinds of crimes have been
considered as control variables: the number of crimes against property (with the exception of that included in the “organized
crime index”), and thefts and robberies, per 10,000 inhabitants. All data on crime is collected by the Italian national institute of
statistics (Istat) in the Informative System on Italian Justice.
Control variables. On the basis of studies on FDI determinants, we have included some control variables in the regression
which are related both to the dimension and to the structure of the provinces in economic terms. Market size, which as studies
show is the principal determinant of FDI, is approximated by two variables: one is the log of the resident population
(Population) in each province, while the other is the share of provincial GDP of that of the region (Size). Since there are strong
regional differences in the level of development between Northern and Southern Italy, we have considered GDP per capita (in
log) as a control variable. We have also included a measure of the degree of openness of the provincial economy, calculated by
exports of GDP (Export) and a proxy of R&D activities, given by the number of patents presented to the European Patent Ofﬁce
(Patents). Furthermore, some variables related to the economic and productive structure have been considered. These are the
share of medium and large ﬁrms (with more than 50 employees) of the total number, and the number of ﬁrms in non-
agricultural sectors per 1000 people (Firms). Since the location of companies also tends to be inﬂuenced by an area's
Fig. 2. Organized crime index, 2001–2005. Cumulated values per 10,000 inhabitants (Italy=100).
Source: Elaborated from Istat data, “Territorial information system on justice”.
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accessibility, we considered an index of total infrastructural endowment (Infrastructure). We then inserted, among the
regressors, a proxy of the ﬁnancial incentives to companies conceded under Law no. 488/92 (Incentives) which, in the period
under examination, was the principal instrument of incentives for investment in Italy. This variable was considered in order to
evaluate whether ﬁnancial incentives and subsidies, conceded particularly to companies investing in Southern Italy, are capable
of attracting foreign companies to areas where disincentives tied to the social and institutional context exist. Table 1 in the
appendix describes the data and their sources.
4.2. Estimations results
The standard assumption of homoskedasticity in the regression disturbances seems too restrictive for panel data where the
cross-sectional units have different sizes and, consequently, different variations (Baltagi, 2008). In this case, problems such as
group-wise heteroskedasticity are likely to arise, producing consistent but non-efﬁcient estimates. To choose themost appropriate
estimator, we start by considering the basic speciﬁcation of Eq. (1), with GDP per capita, population and crime index as
explanatory variables. The plot of the residuals, illustrated in Fig. 3, and the results of the standard tests for heteroskedasticity—
White's andWald's tests—clearly reject the hypothesis of homoskedastic disturbances. Table 4 reports the results of the diagnostic
Table 4
Diagnostic for the basic model.
Test Results
White LM=40.48; p-value=P (Chi2 (9)N40.48)=0.000
Wald a Chi2 103 8049.87; p-value=0
Joint signiﬁcance F F (102.4)=4.40; p-value 0.000
Breusch–Pagan b LM=160.7; p-value=prob. (Chi2 (1)N160.7)=0.000
Hausman test c H=5.34; p-value=prob. (Chi2 (3)N5.34)=0.14
FDI is regressed on GDP per capita, population and organized crime index.
a Based on FGLS residuals.
b A low p-value counts against the null hypothesis that the pooled OLS model is adequate, in favour of the ﬁxed effect alternative.
c A low p-value counts against the null hypothesis that the random effects model is consistent, in favour of the ﬁxed effects model.
Table 5
Organized crime index and FDI inﬂows.
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Const −72.37 ⁎⁎ −62.00 ⁎⁎ −61.71 ⁎⁎ −61.65 ⁎⁎ −62.75 ⁎⁎ −61.54 ⁎⁎
(−35.74) (−22.18) (−19.67) (−19.57) (−19.26) (−17.88)
Organized crime −0.039 ⁎⁎ −0.046 ⁎⁎ −0.046 ⁎⁎ −0.047 ⁎⁎ −0.047 ⁎⁎ −0.042 ⁎⁎
(−2.39) (−2.71) (−2.69) (−2.69) (−2.75) (−2.41)
GDP pc 5.831 ⁎⁎ 4.918 ⁎⁎ 4.901 ⁎⁎ 4.902 ⁎⁎ 5.029 ⁎⁎ 4.954 ⁎⁎
(29.87) (19.12) (18.20) (18.17) (17.56) (15.38)
Population 1.952 ⁎⁎ 1.757 ⁎⁎ 1.745 ⁎⁎ 1.741 ⁎⁎ 1.757 ⁎⁎ 1.706 ⁎⁎
(33.97) (24.55) (18.94) (18.81) (18.86) (16.67)
BigFirms 0.463 ⁎ 0.4845 ⁎ 0.457 0.359 0.552
(1.95) (1.95) (1.32) (1.01) (1.52)
Firms 0.0082 ⁎⁎ 0.0082 ⁎⁎ 0.0081 ⁎⁎ 0.0064 ⁎⁎ 0.0068 ⁎⁎
(3.08) (3.07) (3.00) (2.13) (2.26)
Patents 0.0029 ⁎⁎ 0.0029 ⁎⁎ 0.0029 ⁎⁎ 0.0030 ⁎⁎ 0.0031 ⁎⁎
(4.85) (4.80) (4.76) (4.89) (4.85)
Size 0.0006 0.0008 0.0003 0.0011
(0.21) (0.26) (0.11) (0.34)
Export 0.052 0.053 −0.102
(0.11) (0.11) (−0.22)
Infrastr −0.001 −0.001
(−1.29) (−1.09)
Incentives 0.0001
(0.103)
n 515 515 515 515 515 492
R2 adj. 0.86 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.88
lnL −728.3 −724.6 −724.3 −724.3 −723.8 −690.5
Method: Group-wise WLS. T-statistics in parentheses.
⁎ Indicates signiﬁcance at the 10% level.
⁎⁎ Indicates signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
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for panel data—F statistic, Breusch–Pagan's test and Hausman's test—that suggest that the ﬁxed effect model is not adequate for the
nature of the data. Based on this, in our analysis we used a group-wise weighted least square (WLS) estimator for panel data, a
speciﬁc case of Feasible GLS estimators. The FGLS estimator is consistent under the basic random effects assumptions, and is
advisably used when dealing with simple forms of autocorrelation or group-wise heteroskedasticity (Wooldridge, 2002: 257–
264).
Table 5 reports the results of estimations. The model is sufﬁciently robust and with a high explicative power. The results
conﬁrm how the provincial distribution of FDI inﬂows is primarily inﬂuenced by the level of development and by the dimension
of the local market, as measured by resident population. Nevertheless, the number of ﬁrms, the proxy of R&D activities
(patents) and the share of large ﬁrms result among the determinants of FDI. In all speciﬁcations, the organized crime index is
signiﬁcant and negatively correlated with FDI. Furthermore, it is possible to observe how ﬁnancial incentives to investment do
not seem to inﬂuence the distribution of FDI, probably because such incentives are granted in greater measure to those ﬁrms
that invest in the less developed areas of the country, and therefore this variable also tends to reﬂect some regional
characteristics. To analyse the effects of crime in further depth, we have taken into consideration other speciﬁcations that
include the incidence of theft and robberies and the rate of crimes against property (Prop. crime) as control variables. The
results of estimations, reported in Table 6, show an absence of correlation between these crimes and FDI, while the other
explanatory variables are signiﬁcant and with the expected sign. This is not a surprising result: in fact, research shows that the
incidence of crime (excluding maﬁa type) is generally higher in those areas with greater economic activity (Cracolici and
Uberti, 2009). In our analysis, this would suggest that not all crimes, but only some linked to the presence of a maﬁa-type
organization, tend to discourage potential investors.
5. Conclusive remarks
Using data for 103 Italian provinces, we have examined the impact of organized crime on FDI. The main results obtained can be
summarized as follows:
■ a signiﬁcant, negative correlation between the index of organized crime and FDI was found;
■ such a correlation results as being signiﬁcant evenwhen a proxy of the ﬁnancial incentives to investment is included among the
explanatory variables.
The results obtained are coherent with those surveys that contain the opinions of potential foreign investors, regarding
opportunities for investing in Southern Italy. In other words, our analysis conﬁrms how organized crime is a factor capable of
greatly reducing the degree of regional attractiveness. It is possible to observe how, in some areas, crime is only one aspect—
Table 6
Effects of different crimes on FDI inﬂows.
[1] [2] [3]
Const −67.67 ⁎⁎ −66.50 ⁎⁎ −64.88 ⁎⁎
(−24.37) (−24.81) (−22.66)
GDPpc 5.369 ⁎⁎ 5.189 ⁎⁎ 5.033 ⁎⁎
(19.77) (19.29) (17.68)
Population 1.856 ⁎⁎ 1.891 ⁎⁎ 1.856 ⁎⁎
(24.82) (20.91) (24.42)
BigFirms 0.4386 ⁎ 0.5667 ⁎⁎ 0.7801 ⁎⁎
(1.72) (2.36) (2.86)
Firms 0.0089 ⁎⁎ 0.0088 ⁎⁎ 0.0115 ⁎⁎
(3.09) (3.04) (3.65)
Patents 0.0026 ⁎⁎ 0.0024 ⁎⁎ 0.0023 ⁎⁎
(4.50) (4.02) (3.73)
Infrastr −0.0011 −0.0010 −0.0011
(−1.06) (−0.97) (−0.99)
Theft −0.0007
(−1.57)
Robberies −0.0091
(−1.23)
Prop. crime −0.0002
(−0.70)
n 515 515 442
R2 adj. 0.87 0.87 0.87
lnL −725.5 −726.8 −622.3
Method: Group-wise WLS. T-statistics in parentheses.
⁎ Indicates signiﬁcance at the 10% level.
⁎⁎ Indicates signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
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certainly themost evident and dramatic—of a social and institutional context characterised by other forms of illegality that include
corruption and, evenmore widespread, the violation of regulations that are non-penal but important for the correct functioning of
the economy (Del Monte and Papagni, 2001, 2007; La Spina and Lo Forte, 2006). Overall, forms of illegality determine a socio-
institutional context that lacks some fundamental public goods, such as legality and security.
Numerous studies have shown how the national institutional environment is an important determinant of FDI (Globerman and
Shapiro, 2002; Bénassy-Quéré et al., 2007; Busse and Hefeker, 2007). In the case of Italy, ample economic and sociological
literature attests the existence of signiﬁcant differences in the “quality” and functioning of the regional socio-institutional systems,
in particular between the North and the South of the country: these are historical differences, capable of inﬂuencing long-term
economic development (Putnam, 1993; Peri, 2004). Since the presence of organized crime in Italy also shows marked regional
differences, we cannot exclude that particularly high crime levels, in addition to discouraging investment, are also perceived as
signalling an unfavourable business climate, particularly by potential foreign investors, who generally have less access to available
information. In other words, in a situation where perceptions and expectations play an important role, a high presence of
organized crime could determine a negative image of the local socio-institutional environment and discourage FDI. In general
terms, our analysis suggests that the quality of the local institutional system can inﬂuence decisions regarding the location of
foreign ﬁrms. The policy implications that can be derived are obvious. In the case of Italy, the improvement of conditions of
security (and, possibly, of the quality of the local socioeconomic context) is a fundamental prerequisite for increasing the regional
attractiveness for FDI and, presumably, the effectiveness of policies devoted to attracting foreign investors in the less developed
area of the country.
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Appendix A
Table 1
Description of variables and sources.
Variables Description Sources
FDI Logarithm of the average FDI inﬂow in the provinces in the period 2004–2006.
The data refers to the investment ﬂows and does not include commercial
credits and banking sector transactions.
Italian Exchange Ofﬁce (UIC)
Population Natural logarithm of the resident population in each Italian province.
Proxy of the size of the local market.
Elaborated from ISTAT Census data.
GDPpc Natural logarithm of pro capita GDP. Proxy of the level of development. Elaborated from ISTAT data.
Size Provincial GDP on the GDP of Italy. Proxy of the size of the local market. Elaborated from ISTAT data.
Incentives Variable of proxy of the ﬁnancial incentives granted to ﬁrms, given to the
investment projects granted under the Law 488/92. Data refers to the
projects for creating new production plants in the industrial sector
(excluding “special industry” calls for proposals).
Ministry for Economic Development—Ipi-Print
databank
Firms Number of ﬁrms in non-agricultural sectors, per 1000 inhabitants. Elaborated from ISTAT data.
Export Total export on GDP. Elaborated from ISTAT data.
Patents Number of European patents presented to the European Patent Ofﬁce (EPO). European Patent Ofﬁce—Unioncamere
Bigﬁrm Share of ﬁrms with more than 50 employees out of the total number of ﬁrms. Elaborated from ISTAT data.
Infrastructures Synthetic index of infrastructure endowment (excluding ports)
in percentage terms compared nationwide.
G. Tagliacarne Institute
Extortion The number of crimes of extortion denounced per 10,000 inhabitants. Elaborated from Istat data,
“Territorial Informative System on Justice”
(online databank).
Association The number of crimes of criminal association denounced, including ‘maﬁa’
association, per 10,000 inhabitants.
Elaborated from Istat data, “Territorial Informative System
on Justice” (online databank).
Attacks Number of (bomb) attacks, per 10,000 inhabitants. Elaborated from Istat data, “Territorial Informative System
on Justice” (online databank).
Arson Number of cases of arson, per 10,000 inhabitants. Elaborated from Istat data, “Territorial Informative System
on Justice” (online databank).
Theft Number of thefts, per 10,000 inhabitants. Elaborated from Istat data, “Territorial Informative System
on Justice” (online databank).
Robberies Number of robberies, per 10,000 inhabitants.
Organized
crime
Sum of extortion, attacks arson, association (as above deﬁned)
per 10,000 inhabitants.
Elaborated from Istat data, “Territorial Informative System
on Justice” (online databank).
Property crime Total number of crime against property (with the exception of that
included in the “organized crime index”).
Elaborated from Istat data, “Territorial Informative System
on Justice” (online databank).
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